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Colloquy Essays 
CITIZENS UNITED AND THE SCOPE OF PROFESSOR 
TEACHOUT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE† 
Seth Barrett Tillman 
ABSTRACT—In The Anti-Corruption Principle, an article in the Cornell 
Law Review, Professor Zephyr Teachout argues that the Constitution 
contains a freestanding structural anti-corruption principle (ACP). Evidence 
for this principle can be gleaned from both Founding Era materials, 
illustrating that the Framers and their contemporaries were obsessed with 
corruption, and in several of the Constitution’s key structural provisions. 
The ACP has independent constitutional bite: the ACP (like separation of 
powers and federalism) can compete against other constitutional doctrines 
and provisions, even those expressly embodied in the Constitution’s text. 
For example, Teachout posits that just as Congress—under the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause—may proscribe government officials from accepting 
gifts from foreign governments, Congress may also have a concomitant 
power to prevent corruption—under the ACP—by proscribing corporate 
election campaign contributions and spending. 
This Essay argues that Teachout’s ACP goes too far. On the historical 
point, Teachout is incorrect: the Framers were not obsessed with corruption. 
Moreover, she also misconstrues the constitutional text that purportedly 
gives rise to the freestanding ACP. Even if one concedes the existence of 
the ACP as a background or interpretive principle, its scope is modest: it 
does not reach the whole gamut of federal and state government positions; 
rather, it is limited to federal appointed offices. Why? Teachout’s ACP 
relies primarily upon three constitutional provisions: the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause, the Incompatibility Clause, and the Ineligibility 
Clause. The Foreign Emoluments Clause’s scope does not extend to elected 
positions, state or federal; it only extends to federal appointed officers. 
Likewise, the office-related language in the latter two clauses is similarly 
restricted. Because the scope of these provisions does not extend to elected 
positions, the ACP cannot reach elected positions. In other words, the ACP 
cannot have a wider scope than the constitutional provisions upon which it 
is based. It follows that the ACP cannot inform any historically accurate 
and textually faithful First Amendment analysis of congressional power 
 
†  This Essay was originally published in the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy on 
April 20, 2012, 107 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1 (2012), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/ 
colloquy/2012/7/LRColl2012n7Tillman.pdf, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012800.  
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over state or federal election processes. Still, Teachout’s ACP, even one of 
limited scope, can teach us much. The Anti-Corruption Principle is a 
natural extension of prior scholarship tying our public law to 
contemporaneous eighteenth-century private law concepts and doctrine—
fiduciary duties, equity jurisprudence, trust law, and corporate law. In 
conclusion, the ACP provides fertile ground for new thinking and new 
research, but ultimately, it can teach us very little about election law or the 
scope of First Amendment protections in relation to the political process.  
 
AUTHOR—Lecturer of Law, National University of Ireland Maynooth. I 
thank: Professors Robert W. Bennett, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, David M. 
Driesen, Brian C. Kalt, Gary S. Lawson, John Manning, and Robert G. 
Natelson; Roy E. Brownell II, Esq.; D. Fitzmaurice, S.P. Hickey; and the 
expert student editors at the Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy. 
All errors remain mine. 
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Actually stable laws require a stable vocabulary . . . . Thus the 
magistrates of a state have a duty to see that names are not 
irresponsibly changed. 
—RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES (1948)‡ 
The Constitution was intended to provide structural encouragements to 
keep the logic and language of society as a whole from becoming 
corrupt, representing a technical and moral response to what they saw 
as a technical and moral problem. 
—Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle (2009)†† 
I. WHY THIS COLLOQUY? 
The test of great scholarship is whether it changes the way people think 
and the way people live. That is also true for legal academic scholarship. 
But, for legal academics, perhaps the greatest sign of scholarly achievement 
is judicial reliance upon our craftsmanship. By any measure, Professor 
Teachout’s 2009 Cornell Law Review publication, The Anti-Corruption 
Principle,1 is a success. In 2010, one short year after publication, The Anti-
Corruption Principle was relied upon by Justice Stevens in his Citizens 
United v. Federal Elections Commission dissent,2 just as it was cited, 
 
‡  RICHARD M. WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES 168 (1948) (emphasis added). 
††  Teachout, infra note 1, at 352 (emphasis added). 
1  Zephyr Teachout, The Anti-Corruption Principle, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 341 (2009). 
2  See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf. W. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 35 
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disapprovingly, by Justice Scalia in his concurrence.3 If that were not 
enough of an accomplishment, The Anti-Corruption Principle has also been 
cited in practitioners’ Supreme Court briefs, in other federal and state 
appellate and trial court briefs, and in more than thirty academic articles.4 
Finally, The Anti-Corruption Principle has entered the public discourse: 
George Will excoriated Teachout’s article in his nationally syndicated 
column.5 Now that is an achievement. 
Teachout’s The Anti-Corruption Principle is part and parcel of the 
originalist project.6 It is an attempt to understand the Constitution in light of 
its text, drafting records, ratification debates, and general late eighteenth-
century history. Specifically, Teachout makes three related and sequential 
historical and interpretive claims. 
Step One. The Framers were “obsessed”7 with corruption. In other 
words, preventing, or at least minimizing, corruption was among the 
Framers’ primary goals.8 Absent an appreciation of this purpose, one cannot 
understand either the Constitution’s global architecture or several of its key 
structural provisions.9 
 
(Mont. 2011) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (citing Zephyr Teachout, The Historical Roots of Citizens United 
v. FEC: How Anarchists and Academics Accidentally Created Corporate Speech Rights, 5 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 163 (2011)), rev’d sub nom. Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) 
(per curiam). 
3  See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 928 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
4  A full list of legal citations (including practitioners’ briefs) to The Anti-Corruption Principle can 
be found by running Westlaw’s KeyciteTM on Teachout’s article. 
5  See George F. Will, Op-Ed., End Run on Free Speech, WASH. POST, May 24, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/05/22/AR2009052202396.html. 
6  Indeed, Teachout’s article extends the work of Professors Steven G. Calabresi and Joan L. Larsen, 
who have sought to characterize the Incompatibility Clause as an anti-conflicts-of-interest provision, as 
opposed to a mere separation of powers provision. See Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One 
Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 
(1994). 
7  Teachout, supra note 1, at 405 (“The Framers’ obsession with, and understanding of, political 
corruption makes sense of constitutional phrases like ‘of any kind whatever’ in the [Foreign] 
Emoluments Clause . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 347, 348, 351 n.45, 352, 373, 393 n.245, 
404, 406 (reiterating the Framers’ or the Founders’ obsession with political corruption). 
8  See, e.g., id. at 347 (“[T]he fight against corruption is a central part of the United States 
Constitution—its historical origins, the language of the debates around it, its substance and its structure. 
It is not an overstatement to say that, above all else, the Framers of the Constitution saw the document 
as a structure to fight corruption.” (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Teachout, supra note 2, at 165 (“At 
the time the Constitution was drafted, fighting corruption was at the core of the drafters’ vision for the 
constitutive principles of the country.”). 
9  See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 1, at 359 (“Ultimately, three of the biggest protections [against 
corruption] created by the Framers were the Ineligibility Clause, the Emoluments Clause, and the 
Foreign Gifts Clause.”). The Ineligibility Clause and the Emoluments Clause are the same clause. It 
appears that the third clause Teachout meant to list was the Incompatibility Clause. 
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Step Two. These separate individual anti-corruption constitutional 
provisions, working together, give rise to a freestanding structural anti-
corruption principle (ACP).10 
Step Three. The ACP can compete against other constitutional 
provisions and doctrines, thereby providing originalist foundations for 
upholding congressional enactments that would otherwise be struck down 
under competing principles.11 
For example, Teachout points to the Foreign Emoluments Clause, 
which provides: “[N]o Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under 
them [i.e., the United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, 
accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”12 Teachout suggests that foreign 
governments13 lacking loyalties to the United States may be analogized to 
wealthy corporations, whose “legal loyalties necessarily exclude 
patriotism.”14 Just as Congress under the Foreign Emoluments Clause may 
proscribe certain federal officers from accepting gifts from foreign 
governments, Teachout suggests that Congress may also have a 
concomitant power under the ACP to proscribe corporate election campaign 
contributions and spending. The stakes here are quite high: If Teachout is 
correct, then much First Amendment doctrine and election law 
jurisprudence will have to give way (or, at least, be seriously reexamined) 
in light of the newly discovered (or rediscovered) principle of constitutional 
interpretation. Indeed, Justice Stevens, and the three dissenters who joined 
him, used Citizens United as just such an occasion: The dissent sought to 
recast First Amendment jurisprudence in light of a competing constitutional 
vision—the Framers’ anti-corruption principle. 
Other commentators have criticized Teachout in regard to the second15 
and third16 steps of her analysis. My critique, by contrast, will largely focus 
on the first step of Teachout’s sequential analysis—the initial historical and 
textual claims. In Part II of this Essay, I argue that Teachout’s historical 
 
10  See id. at 342 (“The Constitution carries within it an anti-corruption principle, much like the 
separation-of-powers principle, or federalism. It is a freestanding principle embedded in the 
Constitution’s structure . . . . Corruption has been part of our constitutional dialogue since the 
beginning . . . .”); id. at 410. 
11  See id. at 342, 410–11. 
12  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
13  Teachout actually refers to “wealthy foreigners,” Teachout, supra note 1, at 411, and to “foreign 
powers and individuals,” id. at 393 n.245. Teachout’s usage here is somewhat strange; for Teachout’s 
Foreign Emoluments Clause-reliant analogy to work, she must analogize corporations to foreign 
governments, wealthy or not. Given the government-focused language of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, wealthy individual foreigners simply will not do. 
14  Id. at 393 n.245. 
15  See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399, 403 n.29 (2009). 
16  See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and the First Amendment, 
34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 694 (2011). 
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claim is simply wrong; the Founders were not “obsessed” with corruption. 
Part III discusses how Teachout misunderstands the constitutional text 
giving rise to her purported freestanding anti-corruption principle. Even if 
one concedes (as, in fact, I do) the existence of a freestanding anti-
corruption principle, the scope of that principle extends exclusively to 
appointed federal offices, not to state or federal elected positions. Thus, 
Teachout’s ACP cannot inform our First Amendment analysis in regard to 
congressional power over state or federal election processes. Finally, Part 
IV of this Essay explores what is left of Teachout’s ACP; how a more text-
sensitive and limited ACP nevertheless has substantial implications for 
other areas of constitutional law, i.e., areas beyond election law. Indeed, a 
more text-sensitive ACP and the implications which flow from it are 
consistent with much of the new scholarship of the last decade. However, 
this new text-sensitive view still remains in deep tension with the prevailing 
academic consensus connected with the writings of Professors Akhil Reed 
Amar and Vikram David Amar. 
II. THE FOUNDERS WERE NOT “OBSESSED” WITH CORRUPTION 
From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign 
gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and 
enable them to ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it 
happened that we are at this time a free and independent nation? . . . 
Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed 
[by the Articles Congress]; nor has the purity of our public councils in 
this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of calumny. 
—James Madison, THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (1788)17 
Teachout states more than ten times that the Framers or Founders were 
“obsessed” with corruption.18 She is partly correct: corruption was a 
concern of the delegates who attended the Philadelphia Convention. But, 
Teachout’s “obsession” language, which was uncritically adopted by the 
four-member Supreme Court dissent in Citizens United,19 is misplaced. 
Why? To make her argument, Teachout primarily looks to three 
constitutional provisions20: the Incompatibility Clause,21 the Ineligibility 
Clause,22 and the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Here, I focus on the Foreign 
 
17  THE FEDERALIST NO. 55, at 342 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
18  See supra note 7 (citing Teachout’s “obsession” claim). 
19  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 948 n.51, 963–64 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Teachout’s “obsession” claim and citing the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause). 
20  See supra note 9. 
21  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall 
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.” (emphasis added)). 
22  See id. (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be 
appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or 
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Emoluments Clause; how its drafting history is inconsistent with 
Teachout’s “obsession” claim, and why its original public meaning cannot 
support an ACP reaching independent expenditures. I return to discussion 
of the Incompatibility Clause and the Ineligibility Clause in Part IV. 
A. Teachout’s State Offices Problem 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause had a predecessor in the Articles of 
Confederation. Article VI provided: “[N]or shall any person holding any 
office of profit or trust under the United States, or any of them [i.e., any 
State], accept of any present, emolument, office or title of any kind 
whatever from any King, Prince or foreign State . . . .”23 Although Article 
VI of the Articles is similar to the 1787 Constitution’s Foreign Emoluments 
Clause, the two provisions are not identical. First, the earlier confederation 
provision precluded holders of “office . . . under the United States” and 
holders of “office . . . under . . . any . . . [State]” from accepting gifts from 
foreign governments. By contrast, the Foreign Emoluments Clause of 1787 
only restricts those holding an Office . . . under [the United States] from 
accepting gifts from foreign governments. Second, the Article VI provision, 
on its face, appears to be a mandatory provision not subject to congressional 
control or waiver.24 By contrast, the Foreign Emoluments Clause expressly 
permits federal officers to accept foreign government gifts if Congress 
consents. 
Simply put, if the Framers had been “obsessed” by the potential for 
foreign corruption, they would have made use of the more expansive 
language from the already extant Article VI of the Articles. They did not. 
Instead, the modern Clause represents a reform and a significant relaxation 
of the strictures of the older Clause. Article VI precluded officers . . . under 
any State from receiving gifts from foreign governments, not so the modern 
Foreign Emoluments Clause. Moreover, the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s 
exclusion of state officials from its scope is no small thing; in 1787 (and, to 
some lesser extent, today) state officials had (and have) significant powers 
over the federal government. For example, state legislatures had the power 
to directly choose federal electors—a few legislatures exercised that 
power—and state legislatures chose United States senators (state governors 
now exercise a similar power, subject to state law, in the event of a Senate 
vacancy). State legislatures call Article V national conventions, and state 
 
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .” (emphasis added)). The 
italicized language is unique to this Clause. 
23  ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (emphasis added). 
24  But see Applicability of Emoluments Clause to Employment of Government Employees by 
Foreign Public Universities, 18 Op. O.L.C. 13, 16 n.4 (1994) (Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen.) (noting 
that the Articles Congress permitted Ambassadors Arthur Lee, Benjamin Franklin, and John Jay to keep 
gifts from foreign monarchs). 
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legislatures ratify proposed federal constitutional amendments when that 
power is not vested in state conventions. 
Given that the Constitution of 1787 liberalized the foreign government 
gift-giving regime in regard to state offices, and the importance of those 
state offices to the operation of the federal government, Teachout’s 
historical claim in regard to the Framers’ purported “obsession” seems 
misplaced. And if her historical claim is incorrect, her larger interpretive 
claim is thrown into substantial doubt. Because the scope of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause is limited to Offices . . . under [the United States], and 
excludes offices under any State, it would seem to follow that if there is a 
structural anti-corruption principle of constitutional dimension, the scope of 
that principle—even if “translated” into modern circumstances—cannot 
reach state election processes. 
B. Teachout’s Federal Offices Problem 
Additionally, even in regard to federal offices, the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause remains textually limited to Offices of Profit or Trust 
under [the United States]. This latter phrase leaves much beyond its scope. 
It does not encompass: 
 United States citizens, even if voting in federal elections or 
serving on federal juries; 
 Attorneys admitted to practice before the bar of a federal court; 
 Advisors to the President—even those situated in the White 
House—who lack individualized legal discretion or power to 
affect binding legal relations; 
 Presidential electors;25 
 
25  Teachout does not argue that the ACP applies to the presidency because the ACP applies to the 
processes (elections, etc.) by which electors are chosen, nor does Teachout argue that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause directly applies to electors. And for good reason; electors are not officers, and 
therefore it would seem to follow that they are not officers under the United States. See United States v. 
Hartwell, 73 U.S. 385, 393 (1867) (Swayne, J.) (“An office is a public station, or employment, conferred 
by the appointment of government. The term embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument, and 
duties.”). Although the position of elector sometimes carries state-granted emoluments, it lacks federal 
emoluments, which indicates that it is not an office of or under the United States. See id.; cf. Satrucharla 
Chandrasekhar Raju v. Vyricherla Pradeep Kumar Dev, A.I.R. 1992 S.C. 1959, para. 7 (India) (Reddy, 
J.) (explaining that in determining whether a position is an office of profit under the government of 
India, the court examines, among other factors, if the post is “paid out of the revenues of [the] 
Government of India”). Nor are electors officers of the United States (albeit, a potentially narrower 
category than officers under the United States). See In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379 (1890) (Gray, J.) 
(“Although the electors are appointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United 
States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than are the members of the state 
legislatures when acting as electors of federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as 
electors of representatives in Congress.”); see also McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) (Fuller, 
C.J.) (quoting In re Green approvingly); Vasan Kesavan, The Very Faithless Elector?, 104 W. VA. L. 
REV. 123 passim (2001) (suggesting that electors are properly characterized as holders of Article VI 
107:399 (2012) Citizens United and the Anti-Corruption Principle 
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 State judges in their official capacity subject to mandamus orders 
or other direction by the federal courts; 
 Elected territorial officials; 
 Territorial officers appointed by elected nonjudicial territorial 
officials; 
 Enlisted federal (or state) military personnel; 
 State militia officers, even when called into national service by the 
President during an insurrection or other national emergency; 
 Permanent or ad hoc federal civil servants; 
 Federal contractors; 
 National (or state) convention members under Article V; 
 American nominees or appointees to treaty-created offices;26 
 Multistate compact officials; 
 Qui tam plaintiffs asserting a federal cause of action; 
 Holders of letters of marque and reprisal; 
 Trustees, directors, members, officers, employees, and other 
agents of federally chartered trusts, corporations, and other private 
entities with legal personality; and, 
 Individuals affiliated with private entities created under state (or 
federal, or even foreign) law in which significant equity (or, 
possibly, debt) is held by the United States government.27 
 
public trusts under the United States, and are neither state officers, nor officers under the United States); 
infra note 27. 
26  See infra note 50 (discussing John Randolph’s position). 
27  Although the various posts listed in the main text are not Offices of Profit or Trust under [the 
United States], as used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, some (but not all) of these posts are Offices 
under the Authority of the United States, as used in the Ineligibility Clause. See supra note 22. In any 
event, the argument I put forward in the main text remains sound if the reader agrees that any one of 
these listed positions is beyond the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause (and related constitutional 
provisions also using Office . . . under the United States language). As I explain in more detail below, 
Office . . . under [the United States], as used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, extends to public 
offices created or defeasible by federal statute. It includes officers of the United States subject to the 
Appointments Clause, Inferior Office Appointments Clause, and Recess Appointments Clause, and it 
also includes nonmember legislative officers chosen under the House Officers Clause and Senate 
Officers Clause. Elected (state and federal) officials do not fall within its scope. But see Akhil Reed 
Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 
1061 n.67 (1988) (“[I]t should be noted that if [Article V] delegates [to a national convention] can be 
considered ‘officers of the United States’—and it is not implausible to view them as such . . . .”). Amar 
puts forward no argument supporting his puzzling position. Full support for my claim in regard to each 
of the positions listed in the main text of this Essay can be found in my other publications and working 
papers. See, e.g., Seth Barrett Tillman, Interpreting Precise Constitutional Text: The Argument for a 
“New” Interpretation of the Incompatibility Clause, the Removal & Disqualification Clause, and the 
Religious Test Clause—A Response to Professor Josh Chafetz’s Impeachment & Assassination, 
60 CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. (forthcoming circa Mar. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1622441; cf., e.g., United States v. Mouat, 124 U.S. 303, 307 (1888) (Miller, J.) (“Unless a person in the 
service of the Government, therefore, holds his place by virtue of an appointment by the President, or of 
one of the courts of justice or heads of Departments authorized by law to make such an appointment, he 
is not, strictly speaking, an officer of the United States.” (emphasis added)). 
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The Foreign Emoluments Clause’s inapplicability to these positions 
challenges Teachout’s “obsession” claim. 
C. Teachout’s Federal Impeachment and Disqualification Problem 
Similarly, a corrupt (elected or appointed) federal official who is 
impeached by the House and tried, convicted, and disqualified by the 
Senate remains free to take any state office, and according to the academic 
consensus also remains free to hold a seat in Congress.28 In other words, if 
the Framers believed that corruption posed the chief danger to the new 
Republic, one wonders why corrupt Senate-convicted and disqualified 
former federal officials were still eligible to hold state offices—offices 
which could indirectly affect significant operations of the new national 
government—and were also (arguably) eligible to hold congressional seats, 
thereby injecting corrupt officials directly into national policymaking. This 
too seems to challenge Teachout’s “obsession” claim. 
D. Teachout’s Foreign Law Problem 
Likewise, the Foreign Emoluments Clause proscribes a holder of an 
Office . . . under [the United States] from “accepting” a foreign 
government’s gift or title of nobility. That restriction would not apply either 
to a person who accepts a foreign government’s gift or title prior—even, 
perhaps, just prior—to becoming a federal officer, or to a person who 
accepts a foreign government’s gift or title after leaving federal office. 
Likewise, that restriction would not apply to an active federal officer who 
receives a foreign government’s gift or title by operation of foreign law—
e.g., inheritance—absent any voluntary or individualized act of 
“acceptance.”29 If the world of the Framers was corruption obsessed, as 
argued by Teachout, then why does the Framers’ Foreign Emoluments 
Clause not direct federal officers receiving foreign offices or titles via 
inheritance to actively reject such benefits (or that failure to do so will 
result in the loss of domestic office)? 
Again, if the Framers had been “obsessed” with corruption, it is 
difficult to understand why state offices (and thereby state election 
processes) and all of these federal positions and possibilities (e.g., 
 
28  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House Impeachment Clause); id. § 3, cl. 6 (Senate Trial 
Clause); id. § 3, cl. 7 (Removal and Disqualification Clause); id. art. II, § 4 (Impeachment Clause); 
Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. 
L. REV. 113, 115 n.14 (1995) (asserting that a disqualified federal official may subsequently hold a seat 
in Congress). This position is representative of the modern academic consensus; indeed, the origin of 
that consensus goes back to this influential Stanford Law Review publication. 
29  I thank Luke Beck for this insight. See generally Sykes v Cleary (1992) 176 CLR 77, 113 (Austl.) 
(Brennan, J.) (discussing the extent of the constitutional disqualification against holding domestic public 
office when foreign citizenship accrues by operation of foreign law absent any positive act by the 
recipient). 
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continued government service after disqualification for corruption and 
inheritance under foreign law) were left beyond the scope of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. Was not inheritance the dominant way foreign titles 
were transmitted in the eighteenth century? Would inheritance of titles have 
been beyond the imagination of the Framers in a corruption-obsessed 
world? 
E. Teachout’s Independent Expenditures Problem 
The Foreign Emoluments Clause’s use of “accept” would seem to put 
independent campaign contributions and expenditures involving federal and 
state elections (initiatives and referenda)30 beyond the scope of Teachout’s 
ACP. Where election funds are raised and spent independently of 
candidates (including incumbent candidates), where such monies do not 
flow through candidates’ hands (or their agents’ hands), and where the 
candidates do not direct how the money is spent, the monies will be spent 
without any meaningful or substantive “acceptance” by the candidates. 
It would seem to follow that in regard to all federal and state elected 
positions (i.e., the President, Vice President, federal electors, members of 
Congress, and all elected state posts), the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
cannot provide a textual basis (even if “translated” into modern 
circumstances) for regulating independent campaign contributions and 
expenditures. The contrary view would seem to denude “accept” of any 
substantial meaning. In short, if Teachout is to argue that independent 
expenditures may be validly regulated by federal statute under the aegis of 
her freestanding anti-corruption principle, then she must do so without 
relying on the Foreign Emoluments Clause. 
F. Teachout’s Original Intent Problem(s) 
The logic of Teachout’s original intent-based argument would expand 
the scope of the ACP based on the Framers’ general views or corruption-
speak as expressed in their debates at the Federal Convention and in the 
state ratifying conventions. But the plain text of the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause—i.e., the Constitution’s original public meaning—blocks going 
down that road. The Foreign Emoluments Clause has no application absent: 
(i) an acceptance of a present, title, etc. by (ii) an Office[r] . . . under [the 
United States]. Try as you like, one cannot squeeze everything into the 
scope of those two textual limitations. 
 
30  Constitutional, statutory, and municipal initiatives and referenda generally lack incumbents and 
candidates. Thus, there is no “Officer . . . under [the United States]” to “accept” the benefit conferred. 
Likewise, efforts to promote or to stop proposals to amend the Constitution—among both the public and 
elected officials—would seem to lack incumbents capable of “accepting” any benefit. See generally U.S. 
CONST. art. V (discussing formal procedural requirements for amending the Constitution). 
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Indeed, Teachout’s The Anti-Corruption Principle might supply the 
textbook example of the danger of the original intent approach to 
constitutional interpretation. The democratically enacted public text of the 
Constitution recedes, only to be replaced by amorphous normative 
principles whose contours are “discovered” in documents that were not 
widely—or even publicly—available during the ratification process. If 
those normative principles have deep support in the present day, they might 
have some strong claim on the modern interpreter. But a generalized fear 
that the other is corrupt or disloyal seems an odd and, perhaps, a dangerous 
place to begin our long march back to the lost world of 1787. 
No doubt America has had and continues to have enemies abroad and 
traitors at home. Benedict Arnold was real. But America’s history also 
illustrates that some fears and claims involving divided loyalties have been, 
at times, exaggerated and misused. We might contemplate carefully before 
treading down this road; it might lead to places we had best avoid.31 
III. THE ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE EXTENDS ONLY TO APPOINTED 
FEDERAL OFFICES, NOT TO ELECTED FEDERAL POSITIONS 
Throughout The Anti-Corruption Principle, Teachout assumes that the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause’s Office . . . under [the United States] language 
applies to members of Congress32 and the presidency33 (and, apparently, to 
 
31  See Teachout, supra note 2, at 177 (“Much like one can talk freely about partition in 
Ethiopia/Eritrea but not in Israel/Palestine, one can talk freely about the limits of other constitutionally 
protected rights, but [one] must be more cautious around First Amendment ones.” (emphasis added)). 
Precisely what does Professor Teachout think will happen to Americans who speak or write incautiously 
in regard to the limits of First Amendment rights, that is, other than finding themselves published in the 
Cornell Law Review (or in a subsequent exchange on the Northwestern University Law Review 
Colloquy)? See also Zephyr Teachout, Extraterritorial Electioneering and the Globalization of 
American Elections, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 162, 189 (2009) (“Although [Rupert Murdoch] took the 
oath of [United States] citizenship, he has given no indication that this oath changed his perspectives on 
obligations of the news reporting agency that he runs.”). Is not this a bit of “heads I win, tails you lose”? 
Murdoch, according to Teachout, is somehow blameworthy because he failed to allow his new national 
loyalties to affect his business judgment. But corporations are essentially “foreign,” according to 
Teachout, precisely because their “legal loyalties necessarily exclude patriotism.” Teachout, supra note 
1, at 393 n.245 (emphasis added). If Teachout’s latter claim is true, then Murdoch was in no position to 
express his new national loyalties in the corporate context. If not true, then Teachout’s Foreign 
Emoluments Clause-driven analysis has no useful application to corporations and other similar business 
entities. 
32  See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 1, at 354 (“[T]he limits on holding multiple offices, the limitations 
on accepting foreign gifts . . . were all considered in light of concerns about corruption, and designed to 
limit legislators’ opportunities to serve themselves.” (emphasis added)); id. at 361–62; see also, e.g., 
Teachout, supra note 31, at 168–69 (“Article I, Section 9, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution was written 
to eliminate the threat of foreign money corrupting our domestic decisions [made by federal officials].”). 
Teachout is hardly alone in this regard. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 226 n.11 (1974) (arguing that the Foreign Emoluments Clause applies to 
Senators). But see, e.g., infra notes 39–41 (collecting contrary authority). 
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the vice presidency). She offers no support, evidence, or argument for this 
position. There are good textual and historical reasons to believe she is 
incorrect about her assumption, and if she is incorrect then her ACP applies 
to no state or federal elected positions. None. In other words, even if the 
ACP exists, it has a very limited scope, and it has no implications for 
election law or First Amendment jurisprudence. 
To be clear, Teachout’s position is not frivolous. The meaning of 
Office of Profit or Trust under [the United States] has not been conclusively 
settled by the courts or by scholarship. And, there are several modern 
commentators who take the same position or one akin to hers.34 There may 
also have been some Founding Era material supporting her position. But, 
the dominant view among the Framers and the prevailing public meaning at 
the time of ratification—as indicated by the Constitution’s text and 
contemporaneous practice—appears to have been otherwise. Office . . . 
under [the United States] as used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause and 
 
33  See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 1, at 366 (“Foreign corruption of the Executive was a concern as 
well, as we saw in the Foreign Gifts Clause. The Framers gave the Executive the treaty-making power 
after much disturbed debate.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). Again, Teachout is hardly alone in 
this regard. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 182 (2005) 
(“[T]he . . . general language of Article I, section 9 barred all federal officers, from the president on 
down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any kind whatever’ from a foreign government 
without special congressional consent.” (emphasis added)). But see, e.g., infra notes 39–41 (collecting 
contrary authority). 
34  See, e.g., Applicability of the Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act to 
the President’s Receipt of the Nobel Peace Prize, 33 O.L.C., 2009 WL 6365082, at *4 (Dec. 7, 2009) 
(Barron, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen.) (announcing in ipse dixit that “[t]he President surely ‘hold[s] an[] 
Office of Profit or Trust’” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8) (alteration in original)); see also, e.g., 
Steven G. Calabresi, Closing Statement, A Term of Art or the Artful Reading of Terms?, in Seth Barrett 
Tillman & Steven G. Calabresi, Debate, The Great Divorce: The Current Understanding of Separation 
of Powers and the Original Meaning of the Incompatibility Clause, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 
134, 159 (2008) [hereinafter The Great Divorce] (“The text forbids members of Congress from holding 
‘any Office under the United States.’ The presidency is plainly such an office.”); Richard D. Friedman, 
Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720 n.72 (1988) (arguing that 
the vice presidency is an “office . . . under the United States”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., A Defense of State 
Constitutional Limits on Federal Congressional Terms, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 97, 113 n.59 (1991) 
(describing “congressional seats” as “offices of trust or profit” under the United States); John F. 
Manning, Response, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative Succession to the 
Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 146 (1995) (asserting, without analysis, that “[t]he Presidency is 
surely an ‘Office under the United States’”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to 
Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1772 (2009) (implying that the President falls under 
the scope of the Foreign Emoluments Clause); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Why the Incompatibility 
Clause Applies to the Office of President, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 143 (2009) (asserting 
that “[t]he President occupies an ‘Office under the United States’” and denominating that position the 
“conventional wisdom”); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and the Idea of 
Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 310 & n.45 (1989) (assuming the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause applies to members of Congress); supra notes 32–33 (collecting authority); cf., e.g., Josh 
Chafetz, 20th Amendment Trivia, CONLAWPROF (Nov. 10, 2008, 12:17 PM), http://lists.ucla.edu/
pipermail/conlawprof/2008-November/033299.html (“I happen to think that the President is an officer 
under the United States, but some think otherwise.”). 
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other constitutional provisions extends to appointed offices, i.e., offices 
created or defeasible by federal statute, not elected positions. 
There are several good reasons to believe that Office of Profit or Trust 
under [the United States], as used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, does 
not reach federal elected positions, i.e., members of Congress, the 
presidency, and the vice-presidency. First, eighteenth-century British 
statutes—predating the Constitution—made use of the phrase office under 
the Crown.35 The two phrases are clearly akin, and the latter did not extend 
to members of Parliament or to other elected positions.36 Second, state 
constitutions and state statutes frequently make use of the phrase Office . . . 
under this State. State court jurisprudence discussing the meaning of 
Office . . . under this State is not uniform. There is, however, a line of case 
law excluding constitutionally created elective office from the scope of 
Office under this State.37 Third, the text of the Constitution would seem to 
distinguish Office . . . under the United States from members of Congress. 
For example, the Elector Incompatibility Clause provides: “[N]o Senator or 
Representative, or Person holding an Office . . . under the United States, 
shall be appointed an Elector.”38 Arguably, the language of the Elector 
Incompatibility Clause would seem to distinguish Office . . . under the 
United States from senator and representative positions; otherwise the 
provision’s language is needlessly redundant. A fair reading of the 
Incompatibility Clause also leads to the same conclusion: the constitutional 
text distinguishes Office under the United States from members of 
Congress.39 Finally—although this conclusion is somewhat counterintuitive 
 
35  See, e.g., An Act for the Security of Her Majesties [sic] Person and Government and of the 
Succession to the Crown of Great Britain in the Protestant Line, 6 Ann., c. 7, § 25 (1707) (Gr. Brit.) 
(using “office or place of profit whatsoever under the crown” (emphasis added)). 
36  See, e.g., ANNE TWOMEY, THE CONSTITUTION OF NEW SOUTH WALES 438 (2004) (“As it is an 
elective office, and not generally subject to the direction or supervision of the government, one would 
assume that it is not an office held ‘under the Crown’.”). 
37  See, e.g., State ex rel. Ragsdale v. Walker, 33 S.W. 813, 814 (Mo. 1896) (Macfarlane, J.) (“An 
office under the state must be one created by the laws of the state. The incumbent must be governed by 
state laws, and must exercise his powers and perform his duties in obedience to a statute . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Britton v. Steber, 62 Mo. 370, 374 (1876) (per curiam) (“A State 
officer may be connected with some of the municipal functions, but he must derive his powers from a 
State statute and execute his powers in obedience to a State law.” (emphasis added)). Constitutional 
positions such as governor or member of the state legislature would appear to be beyond the scope of 
office under the state (as understood by the Missouri courts). But cf., e.g., Willis v. Potts, 377 S.W.2d 
622, 628 (Tex. 1964) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Without exception every jurisdiction has declared a 
municipal office not to be an office under the state unless it is one created by the Constitution or statutes, 
its powers and duties [are] defined by statute, or [it is] an office created by some other authority such as 
a municipality, but upon which there is imposed by statute certain state duties.” (emphasis added)). 
38  U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added). 
39  See supra note 21; see also WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL 297 (5th ed. 1946) (“The phraseology [of the Incompatibility 
Clause and Elector Incompatibility Clause] suggests that appointment, as against election, is the 
essential mark of ‘civil office’ or even ‘office.’”). It is possible that Justice Story was the first 
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to modern scholars—earlier commentators recognized that the presidency 
was not within the ambit of the phrase Office . . . under the United States. 
As nineteenth-century commentator David A. McKnight put it: “It is 
obvious that . . . the President is not regarded as ‘an officer of, or under, the 
United States,’ but as one branch of ‘the Government.’”40 Indeed, 
McKnight’s position appears to be rooted in the text of the Constitution’s 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which distinguishes “departments” from 
“officers.”41 
Still, I do not suggest that the Constitution’s text, drafting history, and 
ratification debates are free from all ambiguity on the meaning of Office . . . 
under the United States. Fortunately, we can turn to two incidents from 
President George Washington’s first Administration to understand the 
meaning of this somewhat opaque phrase. Traditionally, precedents set by 
the Washington Administration have carried great weight in originalist 
analysis both left and right of center, in part because Washington was 
sensitive to the weight that future generations would accord his actions and 
also because active partisan politics had not yet begun.42 
 
commentator to note the distinction between elected officials and appointed officers. See 2 JOSEPH 
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 791, at 260 (Boston, Hilliard, 
Gray, & Co. 1833) (“[The Impeachment Clause] says, ‘the president, vice-president, and all civil 
officers (not all other civil officers) shall be removed,’ &c. The language of the clause, therefore, would 
rather lead to the conclusion, that the[] [President and Vice President] were enumerated, as 
contradistinguished from, rather than as included in the description of, civil officers of the United 
States.” (third and fourth emphasis added)); see also RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 149 
(1951) (“‘Officers of the United States’ are not appointed by electoral colleges. They are appointed by 
the President and Senate, by the President alone, by the department heads, or by the courts of law.”). 
40  DAVID A. MCKNIGHT, THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES 346 (Philadelphia, J.B. 
Lippincott & Co. 1878) (emphasis added). McKnight was hardly alone. See infra note 51 (distinguishing 
office from public trust); see also CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: CONTAINING THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
SENATE SITTING FOR THE TRIAL OF WILLIAM W. BELKNAP, LATE SECRETARY OF WAR, ON THE 
ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT EXHIBITED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 145 (Washington, 
Government Printing Office 1876) (Senator Newton Booth, from California, stating, on May 27, 1876, 
“[T]he President is not an officer of the United States. As was tersely said by . . . Senator [Boutwell] 
from Massachusetts, . . . ‘He is a part of the Government.’” (citing STORY, supra note 39, § 791)). 
41  Compare, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (distinguishing “Department[s]” from “Officer[s]” 
in the Necessary and Proper Clause), with Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 10 
Op. Att’y Gen. 74, 79 (1861) (Bates, Att’y Gen.) (“The President is a department of the government; 
and . . . the only department which consists of a single man . . . .” (emphasis added)). Bates eschewed 
describing the President in the language of office and officer. 
42  See AMAR, supra note 33, at 470; Letter from George Washington to James Madison (May 5, 
1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 310, 310–11 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) (“As 
the first of every thing, in our situation will serve to establish a Precedent, it is devoutly wished on my 
part, that these precedents may be fixed on true principles.” (emphasis in the original)); Steven G. 
Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 642 
n.450 (1994) (quoting Washington to Madison correspondence supra). 
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A. Alexander Hamilton’s Response to a Senate Order 
On May 7, 1792, the Senate issued a (purported) order directing the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander Hamilton, to prepare a financial 
statement as follows: 
That the Secretary of the Treasury do lay before the Senate, at the next session 
of Congress, a statement of the salaries, fees, and emoluments, for one year, 
ending the first day of October next, to be stated quarterly, of every person 
holding any civil office or employment under the United States, (except the 
judges,) together with the actual disbursements and expenses in the discharge 
of their respective offices and employments for the same period . . . .43 
In other words, Hamilton was sent an official request for information 
by the Senate of the United States. 
Hamilton responded the following February: 
                                                                 [Philadelphia, February 26, 1793 
Communicated on February 27, 1793] 
[To the President of the Senate] 
The Secretary of the Treasury, in obedience to the order of the Senate of the 
7th of May last, respectfully transmits herewith sundry statements of the 
Salaries fees and Emoluments for one Year ending the first of October 1792, 
of the Persons holding civil offices or employments under the [U]nited States 
(except the Judges) as far as Returns have been rendered—together with the 
disbursements and Expences in the discharge of their respective offices and 
employments for the same Period. 
 No I.  relating to the Department of State 
 No. II Treasury Department . . . . 
 No III Department of war 
 . . . . 
 No VI Office of the Secretary of the Senate  
 No VII Ditto Clerk of the House of Representatives 
 . . . . 
 No XII Clerks of the District Courts 
 . . . . 
 No XVIII Keepers of Lighthouses 
 . . . . 
 All which is humbly submitted             Alexander Hamilton 
Secy of the Treasury 
Treasury Department 
February 26 179344 
 
43  1 JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 441 (Washington, Gales & 
Seaton 1820) (May 7, 1792 entry) (emphasis added). 
44  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Report on the Salaries, Fees, and Emoluments of Persons Holding Civil 
Office Under the United States (Feb. 26, 1793), in 14 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 157, 157–
59 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1969) (emphasis added) (editors’ footnotes omitted). 
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Hamilton was instructed to include “every person holding any civil 
office or employment under the United States, (except the judges[]).” 
Every, not some; any, not some.45 The Senate’s use of “except the judges” 
provided no excuse to fail to list anyone other than judges from his reply. 
His reply matched the language of the Senate order: listing “civil offices or 
employments under the [U]nited States (except the Judges).” 
What did Hamilton do? His reply to the Senate was roughly ninety 
handwritten manuscript pages, and it did not include the salaries or 
disbursements made to senators or representatives. Likewise, Hamilton’s 
reply did not include line entries for the President and Vice President. On 
the other hand, Hamilton’s reply did include line entries for the salary and 
expenses of the Secretary of the Senate and his staff, and for the salary and 
expenses of the Clerk of the House and his staff. 
Simply put, Hamilton’s reply included all appointed officers from each 
of the three branches of the federal government, but no elected officials 
from any branch. Again, if Hamilton was correct, if he correctly identified 
the scope of Office . . . under the United States, and usage here was uniform 
and followed the Constitution’s usage, then Teachout’s ACP cannot reach 
any federal elected officials. 
B. George Washington’s French Gifts 
On December 22, 1791, the French ambassador to the United States, 
Jean-Baptiste, chevalier de Ternant, sent President George Washington a 
letter stating: “Permit me to present you with a new print of the king of the 
french—I shall feel a very great Satisfaction if you will consider that feeble 
mark of my lively and respectful attachment for your person, as worthy 
your kind acceptance.”46 
 
45  Cf. Steven G. Calabresi, Rebuttal, Does the Incompatibility Clause Apply to the President?, in 
The Great Divorce, supra note 34, at 141 (“The word ‘any’ means ‘any,’ not ‘some of.’”); Vasan 
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1792 (2002) (“The word 
‘every’ . . . means every and not some.”). 
46  Letter from Ambassador Ternant to George Washington (Dec. 22, 1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 306, 306 n.1 (Mark A. Mastromarino & Jack D. Warren, Jr. eds., 2000) 
(emphasis added). Washington received other foreign gifts. While President, LaFayette, then a French 
government official, gave Washington the key to the Bastille. See Seth Barrett Tillman, Opening 
Statement, Why President-Elect Obama May Keep His Senate Seat After Assuming the Presidency, in 
The Great Divorce, supra note 34, at 138–40. Although Washington accepted and kept the key, he failed 
to ask for congressional consent to do so. Id.; see also supra note 12. It is also possible that, on another 
occasion, Louis XVI gave Washington a carpet. See 2 ESTHER SINGLETON, THE FURNITURE OF OUR 
FOREFATHERS 503 (1906). If and when this happened is unclear. 
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President Washington replied the same day. He wrote: 
Philadelphia, Decr 22nd 1791. 
Dear Sir, 
I accept, with great pleasure, the new and elegant print of the King of the 
French, which you have been so obliging as to send to me this morning as a 
mark of your attachment to my person. You will believe me, Sir, when I assure 
you, that I have a grateful and lively sense of the personal respect and 
friendship expressed in your favor which accompanied the Print, and that I am, 
with sentiments of sincere esteem and regard, Dear Sir, your most obedt Servt 
Go: Washington.47 
Washington accepted the ambassador’s gift (the print and its frame), he 
kept the gift, and he never asked for congressional consent to accept or to 
keep the gift. This gift was not one of de minimis value,48 nor was it a gift 
from a close personal friend or relative of Washington’s. It was an official 
or diplomatic gift from a foreign ambassador to our head of state.49 How 
can Teachout’s ACP framework explain Washington’s conduct? Will 
Teachout suggest that Washington was corrupt? 
I suggest that there is a very simple way to account for Washington’s 
conduct. Washington acted correctly; it is Teachout’s corruption-centered 
Foreign Emoluments Clause analysis which errs. President Washington was 
not an Officer . . . under the United States, and he did not conceive of his 
position as one. Therefore, he did not fall under the aegis of the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. You might very well ask: if presidents are not 
Officers . . . under the United States, then what are they?50 They are 
 
47  See Letter from George Washington to Ambassador Ternant (Dec. 22, 1791), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 46, at 306 (emphasis added) (editors’ footnote omitted). 
48  See William Adair, George Washington’s Frames: A Study in Contrasts, PICTURE FRAMING 
MAG., June 1992, at 34, 34–35; Wendy Wick Reaves, The Prints, ANTIQUES, Feb. 1989, at 502, 502–03; 
Louis Seize, Roi de Français, Restaurateur de la Liberté, 1790, GEORGE WASHINGTON’S MOUNT 
VERNON: ESTATE, MUSEUM & GARDENS, http://emuseum.mountvernon.org/code/emuseum.asp (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2012). 
49  See William B. Adair, A Masterpiece of Artisanship, PICTURE FRAMING MAG., Aug. 2010, at 28, 
28 (describing the print and frame as “an official diplomatic gift”); id. at 32 (“The history of this Royal 
Palace frame is clear, having been an official gift to Washington.”); cf. Gifts of State, NAT’L ARCHIVES, 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/tokens_and_treasures/gifts_of_state.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2012) 
(“[I]ndeed, every President since George Washington has received gifts of state.”). 
50  Cf. Amar & Amar, supra note 28, at 137 n.143 (“If an acting President, wielding the full and 
awesome executive power of the United States, is not an ‘Officer of the United States,’ what is he?”). 
Unfortunately, this sort of confusion is hardly unique. See, e.g., Oliver P. Field, The Vice-Presidency of 
the United States, 56 AM. L. REV. 365, 382 (1922) (“Whether the president and vice-president are 
officers of the United States is a subject on which conflicting opinions are held. It is not possible to deal 
here at length with . . . that question . . . .” (footnote omitted)); cf., e.g., 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 281 
(Dec. 1791) (Washington, Gales & Seaton 1849) (Congressman Gerry: “[I]f [the Speaker] is not an 
officer [for Succession Clause purposes], what is he?”); 29 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 947 (Feb. 1816) 
(Washington, Gales & Seaton 1854) (quoting John Randolph of Roanoke’s asking rhetorically “[i]f the 
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magistrates or holders of public trusts under the United States per Article 
VI.51 
If Washington correctly identified the scope of Office . . . under [the 
United States], as used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause, then Teachout’s 
ACP has no application to presidents or presidential election processes. 
IV. TEACHOUT’S ANTI-CORRUPTION PRINCIPLE IS A PRIVATE LAW 
PRINCIPLE GRAFTED ONTO OUR PUBLIC LAW 
If the Hamilton and Washington evidence, along with the other 
evidence and arguments presented, establish that the President, Vice 
President, federal electors, members of Congress, and state officers are 
beyond the scope of Office . . . under [the United States] as used in the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, then it would seem to follow that these 
positions are also beyond the scope of the Office . . . under the United 
States language (or the roughly comparable language) in the Incompatibility 
Clause and the Ineligibility Clause.52 Teachout primarily relied upon these 
 
appointment in question [to a treaty-created office] be not an office, he said he should like to know what 
an office is”). 
51  See supra note 41 (distinguishing office from department); cf. supra notes 39–40. Compare U.S. 
CONST. art. VI, cl. 3 (“[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or 
public Trust under the United States.” (emphasis added)), with THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 17, 
at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (“If it be a public trust or office in which they are clothed with equal 
dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger of personal emulation and even animosity.” (emphasis 
added)). Similar language also appears in postratification materials. See, e.g., Letter from George 
Washington to Eléonor François Élie, Comte de Moustier (May 25, 1789), in 30 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 42, at 333, 334 (“The impossibility that one man should be able to 
perform all the great business of the State, I take to have been the reason for instituting the great 
Departments, and appointing officers therein, to assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging the duties 
of his trust.” (emphasis added)); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. 
Ct. 3138, 3146 (2010) (Roberts, C.J.) (quoting from the same passage of the Washington-to-Élie letter); 
AMAR, supra note 33, at 193 (same); Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 42, at 637 (same); cf. 9 STATE OF 
NEW YORK: MESSAGES FROM THE GOVERNORS 515 (Charles Z. Lincoln ed., 1909) (reproducing the 
May 23, 1894 veto message of Governor Roswell P. Flower that placed the officers below the holders of 
public trusts by stating: “That one who holds the power to appoint a public officer, to remove him at will 
and appoint his successor, to fix his salary and to change it from time to time, holds a public trust will 
not be disputed . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
52  See supra notes 22, 27 (opining on the scope of Office under the Authority of the United States, as 
used exclusively in the Ineligibility Clause, and noting that this expression has a wider scope than the 
more generic Office . . . under [the United States] language used in the Foreign Emoluments Clause and 
in other constitutional provisions). Of course, I am assuming that Office . . . under the United States 
(except for Office under the Authority of the United States) was a term of art, used identically across 
constitutional provisions. See supra notes 22, 27. But see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: 
The Second Congress, 1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 624–25 (1996) (“[I]t is difficult to say that 
the Constitution adopts a single meaning of the term ‘office’ or ‘officer’; each clause employing these 
terms must be interpreted according to its own context, history, and purpose.”). If my assumption is 
correct—and Currie’s assumption is incorrect—and if the presidency is excluded from the Office under 
the United States language in the Incompatibility Clause, then that Clause does not preclude joint 
congressional–presidential service. In other words, the Incompatibility Clause is strictly an anti-
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three provisions in The Anti-Corruption Principle. If all elected state and 
federal offices are excluded from the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s 
operation, and they are also excluded from the Office . . . under the United 
States language in the other two clauses, it makes no sense to suggest that 
the Framers were “obsessed” with corruption. Likewise, if all elected state 
and federal offices are excluded from the Foreign Emoluments Clause’s 
operation and are also excluded from the Office . . . under the United States 
language in the other two clauses, it makes little sense to suggest that, if 
you put all these provisions together, then, voilà, you have a freestanding 
structural doctrine or principle establishing a congressional power to 
regulate elections or election-related contributions and spending. 
My view is that the Washington and Hamilton evidence goes far in 
establishing that the original public meaning of the Office . . . under [the 
United States] language in the Foreign Emoluments Clause does not extend 
to elected positions. Whether this particular issue remains in dispute 
between Professor Teachout and me is unclear. Before burdening the reader 
with additional argument and evidence on this point, it might be better to 
wait and see what Professor Teachout has to say, and if, in light of my 
critique, she will elaborate further on or reconsider her views regarding the 
meaning of the Foreign Emoluments Clause and the scope of the ACP. 
Additionally, I should like to know how her views cohere (if at all) 
with those put forward by Professors Akhil R. and Vikram D. Amar who 
have argued that the varying terminology in the Constitution relating to 
office and officer are not meaningfully distinguishable. For example, they 
have maintained that office of the United States, office under the United 
States, office under the Authority of the United States, and even Office 
(standing alone and unmodified) are coextensive and extend exclusively to 
Executive and Judicial Branch officers (including the President) but exclude 
elected and appointed legislative officials and officers.53 This position is 
inconsistent with the view Teachout put forward in The Anti-Corruption 
Principle, and it is also inconsistent with the critique I put forward here. In 
sum, Teachout’s position is that the Constitution’s Office . . . under the 
 
conflicts-of-interest or anti-corruption provision; it is not a separation of powers provision. Cf. Calabresi 
& Larsen, supra note 6; Seth Barrett Tillman, Opening Statement, Why President-Elect Obama May 
Keep His Senate Seat After Assuming the Presidency, in The Great Divorce, supra note 34, passim. 
53  See AMAR, supra note 33, at 182 (“[T]he . . . general language of Article I, section 9 barred all 
federal officers, from the president on down, from accepting any ‘present’ or ‘Emolument’ of ‘any kind 
whatever’ from a foreign government without special congressional consent.” (emphasis added)); Amar 
& Amar, supra note 28, at 114–15 (“As a textual matter, each of these five formulations seemingly 
describes the same stations (apart from the civil/military distinction)—the modifying terms ‘of,’ ‘under,’ 
and ‘under the Authority of’ are essentially synonymous.”); id. at 115–16 (“Thus, federal legislators are 
neither ‘Officers under the United States,’ nor (to the extent that there is any difference) ‘Officers of the 
United States.’”); see also Howard M. Wasserman, The Trouble with Shadow Government, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 281, 288 (2003) (“‘Officers of the United States’ [and] ‘Officers under the United States’ [are] 
synonymous terms which include executive branch officers only.”). 
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United States language embraces all federal elected positions: members of 
Congress, the presidency, and, apparently, the vice presidency. My view 
(which relies upon the Hamilton and Washington evidence above) is that all 
these positions are beyond the scope of the Constitution’s Office . . . under 
the United States language. Akhil and Vikram Amar would exclude 
members of Congress (and nonmember legislative officers such as the 
Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate) from the scope of the 
Constitution’s Office . . . under the United States language, but they would 
include the presidency and, apparently, the vice presidency within its scope. 
The current academic consensus has embraced Akhil and Vikram Amar’s 
position (notwithstanding the position’s inconsistency with the Hamilton 
and Washington evidence and with other early American materials). By 
contrast, Teachout’s position and my own are relative outliers. 
This is no mere invitation to engage in a tangential discussion about 
Akhil and Vikram Amar’s scholarship.54 Teachout’s The Anti-Corruption 
Principle invites us to rewrite First Amendment jurisprudence, but it is also 
an implicit (or, perhaps, an inadvertent) invitation to rewrite the academic 
consensus regarding the Constitution’s usage in regard to office and officer. 
Thus, The Anti-Corruption Principle has profound implications for many 
constitutional provisions, not just the First Amendment. Before we go down 
 
54  Admittedly, such a conversation might be difficult, as it appears to me that Akhil Amar’s writings 
on this subject are not entirely internally consistent. See Amar, supra note 27, at 1061 n.67 (asserting 
that it is “not implausible” to view Article V delegates to a national convention as “officers of the United 
States”). I see no reasonable way to characterize delegates to an Article V national convention as 
Judicial Branch or Executive Branch officers. At first blush, their function would appear entirely 
legislative. However, according to the Amarian framework, the Constitution’s officer terminology does 
not reach the Legislative Branch. So why should the meaning of officers of the United States reach 
members of a convention with a purely legislative function? Again, since 1995, Akhil Amar has argued 
in academic fora that statutory legislative officer succession is plainly unconstitutional. See Amar & 
Amar, supra note 28, passim. But, in congressional testimony, he took a different position. See 
Presidential Succession Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 52 (2004) (statement of Akhil Reed Amar, Southmayd Professor of Law and 
Political Science, Yale Law School) (“And I do think in very, very highly unusual situations where you 
really try to have Cabinet succession, officer succession, and everyone’s gone, I think only a real 
constitutional zealot, maybe without good judgment, would say you can’t have congressional leaders in 
that circumstance because the Constitution really isn’t a suicide pact, and so I think I appreciate sort of 
the prudence involved there.” (emphasis added)). So in precisely what circumstances does the 
Constitution’s use of Office embrace legislative officers? Finally, the Presidential Succession Clause 
uses the language of Officer. Akhil Amar has described former officers as nonofficers, i.e., private 
citizens. As such, he has argued that a Speaker or Senate President pro tempore cannot resign his 
legislative position after succeeding to the presidency. In other words, only current officers are eligible 
to succeed under the Succession Clause, and if an officer resigns his legislative position after succeeding 
to the presidency, he loses the ability to retain the presidency. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 171; Amar & 
Amar, supra note 28, at 120. However, the Impeachment Clause also uses the language of office, and 
Professor Amar has suggested that former officers may be impeached. See AMAR, supra note 33, at 568 
n.53; Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer’s Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203, 214 
n.36 (1996). What accounts for these many strange inconsistencies relating to the language of office and 
officer? 
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that road, Teachout should explain to us exactly what the stakes are and 
where her new (or purportedly “old” Framer-centric) view will take us. For 
this reason, it would be desirable, not only for Teachout to respond to my 
critique, but for other commentators who have taken a position on this issue 
to do so.55 
One last point must be made. I do not think the ACP can reach elected 
positions—state or federal—and, as such, it cannot inform our views of 
election law or the First Amendment. However, I do agree that Teachout’s 
broad conceptual framework is sound. There is a structural anti-corruption 
principle of constitutional dimension. That principle, the ACP, vindicates 
substantial congressional control over statutory officers, i.e., officers under 
the United States. It puts federal statutory officers in a fiduciary relationship 
under the government, in respect to the officers’ elected masters and all of 
the nation’s citizens. In this sense, Teachout’s paper is a natural extension 
of prior scholarship tying our public law to contemporaneous eighteenth-
century private law concepts and doctrine—fiduciary duties, equity 
jurisprudence, trust law, and corporate law.56 
For example, Teachout points out that the concept of corruption 
embraced two related subconcepts: “dependency” relationships57 and “self-
serving” activity, i.e., “us[ing] . . . public power for private ends.”58 
Teachout is entirely correct about this. The domination/dependence theme 
is the subject matter of the Incompatibility Clause, and the bias/self-
dealing/self-serving theme is the subject matter of the Ineligibility Clause. It 
is precisely because these two clauses attack two different, albeit related, 
 
55  Other (living) commentators who have embraced this position, i.e., that all office-related 
language means the same thing, or who have taken a position akin to it, include: Professors David 
Barron, Steven G. Calabresi, Josh Chafetz, Richard D. Friedman, John Manning, Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Saikrishna B. Prakash, and Howard M. Wasserman, and Mssrs. John C. Fortier, Vasan 
Kesavan, Norman J. Ornstein, and David J. Shaw. See, e.g., John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, 
Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993, 995–96 (2004) (“The 
key term is ‘Officer,’ by which the Framers likely meant ‘Officer of the United States’ . . . ‘Officers of 
the United States’ are federal executive branch figures.”); supra notes 32–34, 53 (collecting authority). 
56  See infra notes 59–61; supra note 6; Paul Finn, The Forgotten “Trust”: The People and the State, 
in EQUITY: ISSUES AND TRENDS 131, 133 (Malcolm Cope ed., 1995) (noting that English judges brought 
public officials “into a fiduciary relationship with the public” (citing R. v. Bembridge, (1783) 99 Eng. 
Rep. 679 (K.B.), 22 St. Tr. 1)); Geoffrey P. Miller, The Corporate Law Background of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, in THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 144, 144 (Gary Lawson 
et al. eds., 2010); Ethan J. Leib et al., A Fiduciary Theory of Judging, 101 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2029001; Robert G. Natelson, The Agency Law 
Origins of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 243, 285–314 (2004); Robert G. 
Natelson, The Constitution and the Public Trust, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 1077, 1136–68 (2004); D. Theodore 
Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming Jan. 2013), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2019159; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of 
Judicial Review, 116 YALE L.J. 502, 545–55 (2006); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of 
Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 135–61 (2006). 
57  Teachout, supra note 1, at 363. 
58  Id. at 373–74. 
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structural problems that the Framers chose different office-laden language 
within each of these two provisions. The Incompatibility Clause makes use 
of Office under the United States language, and the Ineligibility Clause 
makes use of Office under the Authority of the United States language. 
Different language accomplishes different purposes, just as one might 
suspect from reasonable and accomplished draftspersons. 
Indeed, the distinction between domination by third parties and bias in 
connection with self-interest still plays an active role in corporate law. A 
court, applying traditional principles of equity, will review a decision of a 
board of directors for an alleged breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty59 on 
a showing that a majority of those voting in support of a contested 
transaction were either: (i) dominated (lacked independence), or (ii) biased 
(in the self-serving sense).60 
I suspect that Teachout’s ACP can teach us very little about election 
law or the First Amendment, but The Anti-Corruption Principle 
significantly adds to our understanding of the private law genealogy of our 
Constitution’s linguistic heritage.61 That might not be what Teachout hoped 
to achieve, or what Justice Stevens intended in Citizens United, but it is a 
considerable intellectual accomplishment nonetheless. 
 
59  Cf. Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice to William P. Marshall, Deputy Counsel to the President, Application of the 
Coreligionists Exemption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 22 n.46 (Oct. 12, 2000) (noting that 
“[t]here is virtually no federal case law discussing what constitutes a ‘public Trust’ for purposes of 
[A]rticle VI’s religious test ban,” and hypothesizing that it extends either to “Senators and 
Representatives” and/or to “any position or function the performance of which is subject to a duty of 
loyalty to the United States”) (on file with the Northwestern University Law Review). Notice how 
Assistant Attorney General Moss makes use of a concept well developed in private law—the fiduciary 
duty of loyalty—to understand a public law concept, i.e., the meaning of public trust under the United 
States. 
60  See, e.g., In re InfoUSA, Inc. S’holders Litig., 953 A.2d 963, 990 (Del. Ch. 2007) (Chandler, C.) 
(refusing to dismiss the action under the business judgment rule, and excusing demand on the board 
because the “complaint contains allegations . . . that allow me to determine that a majority of these 
directors were either interested or lacking in independence at the [relevant] time . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). 
61  The seminal article on the subject is by Dean Enlow. See Eric Enlow, The Corporate Conception 
of the State and the Origins of Limited Constitutional Government, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2001). 
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